A common and effective technique is the use of a MCOO. Distribute terrain analysis products as widely as possible. Make the specific terrain factor overlays available to other units and staff sections for their own planning use. They will refine them to meet their own needs. For example, the CIAS will use the results of evaluating the terrain's effects on observation to aid in evaluating the threat's intelligence collection capabilities. For more information on terrain analysis, see FM and FM For terrain analysis techniques and considerations in various climates and terrain types, see FMs , , , , and The weather team analyzes the weather's direct effects and its effects on terrain and integrates climatic, forecast, and current weather data with terrain analysis.
Terrain and weather analyses are inseparable. You should have already included the weather's effects on terrain during terrain analysis. In this sub-step, weather analysis evaluates the weather's direct effects on operations.
If time and resources permit, you can obtain climatology-based overlays for planning purposes from the USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center. Once deployed, the supporting USAF weather team can prepare similar but less detailed overlays depending on the availability of data. Weather teams can provide detailed descriptions of the weather's effects on each system and sub-system of your unit's equipment.
If you are not directly supported by a weather team, request support from your higher headquarters. Evaluate the effects of each military aspect of weather. However, just as in terrain analysis, focus on the aspects that have the most bearing on the situation your command faces.
Begin the evaluation of each aspect with the local climatology, but always free-tune the evaluation with the most current forecast available. You use two sub-steps to accomplish weather analysis: 1 Analyze the military aspects of weather; and 2 Evaluate the weather's effects on military operations.
Low visibility is beneficial to offensive and retrograde operations. In the offense, it conceals the concentration of maneuver forces, thus enhancing the possibility of achieving surprise. When evaluating visibility, consider the effects of all aspects of the weather. For example, temperature conditions can have either an adverse or beneficial effect on the use of modern thermal sights. Cloud cover can negate the illumination provided by the moon.
Precipitation and other obscurants can also have varying effects. A major factor in evaluating visibility is the amount of available light.
Consider the phase of the moon as well as the times associated with Winds of sufficient speed can reduce the combat effectiveness of a force downwind as the result of blowing dust, smoke, sand, or precipitation. The upwind force usually has better visibility.
NBC operations usually favor the upwind force. Strong winds and wind turbulence limit airborne, air assault, and aviation operations. Evaluation of weather in support of these operations requires information on the wind at the surface as well as at varying altitudes. High winds near the ground increase turbulence and may inhibit maneuver. High winds at greater altitudes can increase or reduce fuel consumption.
Wind-generated blowing sand, dust, rain, or snow can reduce the effectiveness of radars and communication systems. Strong winds can also hamper the efficiency of directional antenna systems by inducing antenna wobble. Precipitation affects soil trafficability, visibility, and the functioning of many electro-optical systems. Heavy precipitation can reduce the quality of supplies in storage.
Heavy snow cover can reduce the efficiency of many communication systems as well as degrade the effects of many munitions and air operations. Cloud cover affects ground operations by limiting illumination and the solar heating of targets. Heavy cloud cover can degrade many target acquisition systems, the use of infrared-guided artillery, and general aviation operations. Heavy cloud cover often canalizes aircraft within air AAs and during the final approach to the target. Partial cloud cover can cause glare, a condition that attacking aircraft might use to conceal their approach to the target.
Some types of clouds reduce the effectiveness of radars. Extremes of temperature and humidity reduce personnel and equipment capabilities, and may require the use of special personnel shelters or equipment. Air density decreases as temperature and humidity increase, which may require reduced aircraft payloads.
Temperature "crossovers," when target and background temperatures are nearly equal, degrade the use of thermal target acquisition systems. The length of crossover time depends on air temperature, soil and vegetation types, amount of cloud cover, and other factors. Weather has both direct and indirect effects on military operations.
Examples of indirect effects are All of these conditions would significantly affect the selection of defensive positions even though their effects are indirect. An effective technique for evaluating and depicting the weather's indirect effects is to modify the terrain analysis products to show the effects of weather considerations. Remember to revise the effects of weather upon terrain analysis as the weather changes from the originally evaluated conditions. You must also evaluate the weather's direct effects on personnel, equipment, and operations.
Begin by establishing the critical values of the military aspects of weather that affect the effectiveness of A forecast of 2 km visibility can then be quickly evaluated as making the conditions for airborne operations marginal.
See Appendix B for other examples and techniques in establishing critical values. An example of critical values arranged into matrix format is shown at Figure Once you have set the critical values, use them as gauges to evaluate the effects of local weather on the operations and COAs available to both friendly and threat forces. An example might be an S2 reporting to his commander: "Sir, weather practically rules out the use of air assault operations because temperature and humidity have reduced the lift capability of the enemy's helicopters by 70 percent.
Figure is an example of one type of matrix that shows the results of the evaluation of the weather's effects on military operations. See Chapter 3 for other examples. Regardless of the means of presentation, ensure you focus on the effects of weather on military operations rather than the factors that make up the analysis.
For example, you might express the effects of visibility and precipitation on the mobility of a force in terms of movement rates or the amount of time the force will be exposed in an engagement area.
These types of evaluations are more readily usable by the commander than statements such as " An example might be an S2 reporting to his commander: "Sir, religious considerations will make cordon and search operations on Wednesdays extremely difficult to execute--the local population will be praying at the same time we're trying to conduct the search.
In another example, during riot control assistance to civil authorities the influence of gangs or other unofficial political elements becomes very important.
Typical Characteristics: Because these aspects vary greatly with each circumstance, a comprehensive list cannot be provided here. However, depending on the situation, these characteristics might include:.
As with terrain and weather, the evaluation of the other characteristics of the battlefield is not complete until you express it in terms of their effects on friendly and threat COAs. In some situations, the "other characteristics" of the battlefield are of more concern than terrain and weather. An historical example illustrates this well:. Certain provisions of this treaty categorized land within the old canal zone into five different categories.
The rights and responsibilities of the United States and the Republic of Panama varied widely depending upon the legal designation of the terrain. To further illustrate this point, the perception of "seizing the moral highground" often influenced the actions of both sides in Panama far more than the terrain and weather.
These other characteristics of the battlefield are particularly important at the operational and strategic levels, but also play a major role at the tactical level in operations other than war. Chapter 5 gives examples of "other characteristics" as they might affect operations at different levels of war. Although you will usually be forced to discuss the effects of other characteristics of the battlefield in text products or a matrix, always attempt to use graphics.
Examples of graphic depictions include an overlay showing areas most vulnerable to insurgent operations, based on demographics; or an overlay identifying HVTs in the logistics infrastructure, in either the threat or friendly rear area.
Combine the evaluation of the effects of terrain, weather, and the other characteristics of the battlefield into one integrated product. Do not focus on the factors that lead to your conclusions. Instead, focus on the total environment's effects on COAs available to both friendly and threat forces. You must address the battlefield's effects on threat as well as friendly COAs. A good technique for accomplishing this is to completely place yourself in the perspective of the threat's S2 and S3 who must recommend a set of COAs to their commander.
Ensure that you evaluate the effects of battlefield environment on threat COAs considering the specific threat your command is facing. Following are some examples to consider:. The bottom line is to evaluate the battlefield completely from the perspective of the threat.
Remember to express this evaluation in terms of COAs, not detailed descriptions of the analytical factors that led to the conclusions. Focus the commander on concluding statements such as, "Sir, the battlefield environment best supports insurgent attacks on US and host nation HN forces near Daleytown.
The next best place for their operations is Elkinsville. Communicate the final conclusions from the description of the battlefield environment in written reports such as the analysis of the AO or the intelligence estimate. Distribute the graphic products developed during the analysis and evaluation as needed to support the remainder of the staff and other commands in their own IPB and planning efforts.
The determination of threat force capabilities and the doctrinal principles and TTP threat forces prefer to employ. While planning a contingency show of force operation, a J2 directs the Joint Intelligence Center JIC to study the decisions on record of the targeted country's dictator. As a result of this research, the intelligence center produces a model of how the dictator makes decisions, with special emphasis on his tendencies during political crises.
Meanwhile, the S2 of the brigade which will conduct the operation does his own evaluation of the threat. He evaluates his contingency area order of battle OB files and determines that the two threat brigades within the target area are equipped, organized, and trained well enough to be capable of offensive as well as defensive operations against the friendly brigade.
He prepares threat models depicting the threat's normal offensive and defensive operations in built-up areas the setting for the show of force operation. Know the enemy.
Develop threat models which accurately portray how threat forces normally execute operations and how they have reacted to similar situations in the past. Know what the threat is capable of, given the current situation. Threat COAs developed in the next step of IPB reflect what the threat is and is not capable of and trained to do in similar situations. At the other extreme, the friendly staff may waste time and effort planning against threat capabilities that do not exist. Threat models depict how threat forces prefer to conduct operations under ideal conditions.
They are based on the threat's normal or "doctrinal" organization, equipment, doctrine, and TTP. Threat models result from a detailed study of the threat force. Ideally, you construct threat models prior to deployment. Even after deployment, however, continue to evaluate the threat and update the threat models as required.
An effective technique for recording threat models is to use the target spreadsheet format see Figure Doctrinal templates illustrate the deployment pattern and disposition preferred by the threat's normal tactics when not constrained by the effects of the battlefield environment. They are usually scaled graphic depictions of threat dispositions for a particular type of standard operation, such as a battalion movement to contact, an insurgent ambush, or a terrorist kidnapping. Figure shows one such doctrinal template.
Construct doctrinal templates through an analysis of the intelligence data base and an evaluation of the threat's past operations. Determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and how he deploys and employs his units and the various BOS assets. Look for patterns in task organization of forces, timing, distances, relative locations, groupings, or use of the terrain or weather.
Focus on major elements as well as individual HVTs. Even unconventional operations lend themselves to graphic depiction. For example, an evaluation of the data base might indicate that when robbing banks the threat always sends four guerrillas inside with at least two remaining outside. The four who move inside the bank usually take up positions at distinct locations within the bank.
This type of information can easily be converted into a graphic representation, although not necessarily to a standard map scale. Doctrinal templates can also portray the threat's normal organization for combat, typical supporting elements available from higher commands, frontages, depths, boundaries, engagement areas, objective depths, and other control measures.
Whenever possible, convert these patterns into graphic representations such as overlays or sketches. Doctrinal templates are tailored to the needs of the unit or staff section creating them. For example, a division G2 creates a template that differs in scope from that constructed by a battalion S2; the template constructed by an EW section differs drastically from that constructed by an air defense unit. An air defense doctrinal template, for example, would include a description of normal strike package composition, altitudes, time spacing between groups of aircraft, and so forth.
Some doctrinal templates consider the threat unit or force as a whole, while others focus on a single BOS, such as intelligence or fire support. The threat model includes a description of the threat's preferred tactics.
It addresses the operations of the major units or elements portrayed on the template and the activities of the different battlefield operating systems. It also contains a listing or description of the options available to the threat should the operation fail branches , or subsequent operations if it succeeds sequels. Even if the threat's preferred tactics can be depicted graphically, the threat model includes a description.
This allows the template to become more than a "snapshot in time" of the operation being depicted. It aids in mentally wargaming the operation over its duration during the development of threat COAs and situation templates.
The description should address typical timelines and phases of the operation maneuver and support , points where units transition from one formation to another, and how each BOS contributes to the operation's success.
Since the target's value usually varies with its role in each phase of the operation, ensure that you examine each phase separately. Like the template itself, you develop the description of the threat's tactics and options from an evaluation of his doctrine and past or current operations. Include a description of the branches and sequels normally available to or preferred by the threat should the depicted operation succeed or fail.
For example, the threat might prefer to follow successful attacks with pursuit. Should an attack begin to fail, his preferred branches might include committing reserves, reinforcement, or shifting the main effort. Should the attack fail, his preferred sequel might be a hasty defense.
If the data base reveals any decision criteria that cause the threat to prefer one option over another, include that in the description. This information will aid in wargaming threat and friendly COAs, targeting, and deception planning. Assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of the mission depicted and described on the template are HVTs. Identify HVTs from an evaluation of the data base, the doctrinal template, its supporting narrative, and the use of tactical judgment.
Develop the initial list of HVTs by mentally wargaming and thinking through the operation under consideration and how the threat will use the assets of each BOS to support it.
Identify any that are critical to the operation's success. For example, while mentally wargaming an enemy air attack against friendly targets supported by a well prepared air defense system, it is logical to assume that the enemy will need a substantial air defense suppression package as part of the strike force.
In such a case, threat aircraft commonly used in such a role become HVTs. Identity assets which are key to executing the primary operation. Also identify any assets which are key to satisfying decision criteria or initial adoption of the branches and sequels listed in the description and option statements. Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider his ability to substitute other assets as well as the likelihood of adopting branches to the operation.
After identifying the set of HVTs, rank order them with regard to their relative worth to the threat's operation and record them as part of the threat model. An HVT's value usually varies over the course of an operation. Identify any changes in value by phase of the operation and make the necessary annotations.
As you identify key assets, group them into one of the 13 categories used to develop target sets. These 13 categories are In a pinch, you can annotate the identified HVTs in the margins of the doctrinal template. When fully developed, HVT evaluations take the form of target relative value matrices see Figure Target value matrices give a measure of the relative worth of targets, the rationale behind an attack on each type of target, and the resulting effects on the operation.
See FM for a complete discussion. Threat capabilities are the broad COAs and supporting operations which the threat can take to influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission. They take the form of statements, such as For example, an attack may be an envelopment, a penetration, or other variations of an attack.
A retrograde movement may be a delaying action, a withdrawal, or a retirement. Other capabilities include support to broad COAs or specific types of operations.
Examples of these types of capabilities are At other levels of war and during operations other than war you will consider other types of operations and broad COAs. In any case, start with the full set of threat models and consider the threat's ability to conduct each operation based on the current situation. Most situations will not present the threat with the ideal conditions envisioned by his doctrine and TTP. He will usually be under-strength in terms of personnel or equipment.
He may be short of logistical support. He may not enjoy air superiority. His troops may be inexperienced or poorly trained. As a result, the threat's actual capabilities usually will not mirror the ideal capabilities represented by the complete set of threat models. Do not limit the threat models and evaluation of capabilities strictly to military forces of the threat. Student rioters during a noncombatant evacuation NEO operation, for example, are a threat to the friendly mission.
Evaluate them using all the techniques described in this section. Like all other parts of the IPB process, tailor the evaluation to your particular needs. Signal units focus on the ability of the threat to disrupt friendly communications.
Disseminate the results of evaluating the threat as widely as possible. This allows other staff sections and units to include them in their own IPB process. For example, the doctrinal templates produced by a division will be refined by subordinate battalions to include a greater degree of detail. Templates produced by a G2 or S2 section will be modified by other staff sections, possibly to highlight specific BOSs in more detail, such as air defense assets.
In addition to distributing threat models, disseminate the results of evaluating the threat's capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities. The traditional means of disseminating the evaluation is the intelligence estimate, but always use the means best suited to the situation. The graphics that make up the threat model might best be delivered by courier. You can also deliver other parts of the evaluation by voice communications or over automated systems.
For a full discussion of the analytical techniques used in evaluating the threat, refer to FMs , , S , and The identification and development of likely threat COAs that will influence accomplishment of the friendly mission.
A Boer S2 tells his commander: "Sir, the enemy platoon leader's likely objective is to retain control of the only crossing point suitable for wheeled traffic over the Silliaasvogel River. He can defend the crossing, known as Duffer's Drift, with his 50 soldiers in any one of the following ways:.
A variant of this COA would be for him to establish a trenchline astride the main road. This goes against every canon in British doctrine; however, we must consider this COA because it is so dangerous to the accomplishment of our mission. We need to conduct reconnaissance of the riverbed and the Kraal in order to find out which of these COAs he has chosen.
Replicate the set of COAs that the threat commander and staff are considering. Identify all COAs that will influence the friendly command's mission. Identify those areas and activities that, when observed, will discern which COA the threat commander has chosen. The staff uses the resulting threat COAs, along with other facts and assumptions about the battlefield environment, to drive the wargaming process and develop friendly COAs. You will fail to identify which of the possible COAs the threat has chosen, leading to surprise of the friendly command.
Start with the threat command at least one level above your own and identify likely objectives and the desired end state. As you identify the likely objectives at each level of command, repeat the process for the next subordinate level, working down to two levels below your own command. Ensure that each level's objective will accomplish the likely objectives and desired end state of its parent commands.
To ensure that you consider the full set of COAs available to the enemy, you must at least consider Consider each sub-set of COAs independently to avoid forming biases that restrict the analysis and evaluation.
Once you have evaluated each sub-set separately, combine them to eliminate redundancy and minor variations. Compare the consolidated list to threat capabilities you identified in step 3 of the IPB process, Evaluate the Threat , and eliminate any COAs which the threat is incapable of executing.
Based on the evaluation of the threat's capabilities step 3 of the IPB process , select threat models that will accomplish the threat's likely objectives. You will usually find that terrain, weather, and other characteristics of the battlefield environment "offer" a limited set of COAs, encouraging some while discouraging others. Start with the general COAs open to the threat, such as deliberate attack, hasty attack, defend, and delay.
Further define each general COA as a set of specific COAs by integrating the threat models from step 3 of the IPB process with the description of the battlefield's effects from step 2. Factors to consider include For example, a general COA such as "hasty attack" might be further defined as a set of specific COAs such as "with main effort in the east.
Each threat COA you identify should meet five criteria: suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine. A threat COA must have the potential for accomplishing the threat's likely objective or desired end state. If the COA is successfully executed, will it accomplish the threat's objectives? Consider the time and space required to execute the COA. Are they available? Consider the resources required to execute the COA. Does the threat have the physical means required to make it a success?
Occasionally, force ratios or other factors might indicate that the threat lacks the means to accomplish his likely objectives.
Before discounting the threat completely, consider all actions he might take to create the conditions needed for success. For example, he might conduct economy of force operations in some sectors in order to generate sufficient combat power for offensive operations in others. His lack of resources might force him to violate his own doctrine in order to accomplish his objective.
What seemingly radical measures can he take to create the conditions for success? Avoid surprise. Consider the amount of risk involved. Will threat forces accept the amount of risk entailed in adopting the COA? Can they afford the expenditure of resources for an uncertain chance at success?
This is obviously a subjective judgment based on knowledge of the threat and his doctrine. In some instances, the threat might undertake otherwise unfavorable COAs, particularly if they are the only means to accomplishing his objective. Each threat COA must be significantly different from the others. Otherwise, consider it as a variation rather than a distinct COA. Factors to consider in determining if a COA is "significantly" different are Each threat COA must be consistent with the threat's doctrine.
Base the evaluation of consistency on the threat's written doctrine and observations of his past application of doctrine, as revealed in the intelligence data base. Do not, however, overlook threat efforts to achieve surprise by deviating from known doctrine or using "wildcard" COAs.
If the friendly command's mission is to attack to destroy the threat, threat COAs that would interfere with the friendly mission are defend including counterattacks , reinforce, and withdraw. If your command's mission is to attack to seize a terrain objective, threat COAs that could interfere with the mission are defend, including counterattacks and reinforce. Threat withdrawal would favor accomplishment of the friendly mission and would also be included in the set of probable COAs if there were indications the threat might actually withdraw.
The resulting set of COAs depicts the full set of options available to the threat. Remember that the threat COAs you identify are assumptions about the threat, not facts. Because of this, you cannot predict with complete accuracy which of the COAs the threat will employ. However, the commander and his staff still need to develop a plan that is optimized to one of the COAs, while still allowing for contingency options if the threat chooses another COA.
Therefore, you must evaluate each COA and prioritize it according to how likely you estimate it is that the threat will adopt that option. Establish an initial priority list to allow the staff' to plan for friendly COAs. Consider especially any changes in the threat's perception of friendly forces. Use judgment to rank the threat's COAs in their likely order of adoption. Modify the list as needed to account for changes in the current situation. For example, the initial priority order of threat COAs does not account for the friendly COA, since one has not yet been selected.
Friendly dispositions may change as the command moves to adopt its own COA. How will that change the likelihood of each threat COA? Given time, you could develop several different versions of the prioritized list of threat COAs--a different order for each potential friendly COA. Alternatively, after the commander has selected the friendly COA, reprioritize the initial list of threat COAs to reflect changed friendly dispositions and activities.
Once you have identified the complete set of threat COAs, develop each COA into as much detail as the situation requires and time available allows. Base the order in which you develop each COA on its probability of adoption and the commander's guidance. To ensure completeness, each COA must answer five questions:. Consider threat forces available to at least one level of command above your own when developing each COA. For example, a battalion S2 would consider the COAs available to threat regiments and brigades.
This helps to ensure that you account for possible reinforcing forces and the higher command's own objectives and intent. Time permitting, the final product should consist of a comprehensive, detailed set of threat COAs. Work to a degree of resolution at two levels of command below your own.
For example, a brigade S2 would depict the missions and actions of threat battalions and companies in the threat COAs he develops. Situation templates are graphic depictions of expected threat dispositions should he adopt a particular COA.
They usually depict the most critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the G2 and G3. However, you might prepare several templates representing different "snapshots in time" starting with the threat's initial array of forces. These are useful in depicting points where the threat might adopt branches or sequels to the main COA, places where the threat is especially vulnerable, or other key points in the battle such as initial contact with friendly forces.
You use situation templates to support staff wargaming and develop event templates. To construct a situation template, begin with the threat model representing the operation under consideration.
Overlay the doctrinal template on the products that depict the battlefield environment's effects on operations. Using your judgment and knowledge of the threat's preferred tactics and doctrine as depicted in the threat model, adjust the dispositions portrayed on the doctrinal template to account for the battlefield environment's effects.
Obviously, there will be many options available. Attempt to view the situation from the point of view of the threat commander when selecting from among them. Check the situation template to ensure that you have accounted for all the threat's major assets, and that none have been inadvertently duplicated see Figure Ensure that the template reflects the main effort identified for this COA.
Compare the depicted dispositions to the threat's known doctrine; check for consistency. Consider the threat's desire to present an ambiguous situation and achieve surprise. Include as much detail on the situation template as the time and situation warrant. For example, if the threat is defending, identify the likely engagement areas, reinforcing obstacle systems, and counterattack objectives that form part of his defensive COA.
Ensure you depict the locations and activities of the HVTs listed in the threat model. Next, using the description of preferred tactics that accompanies the doctrinal template as a guide, think through the COA's scheme of maneuver. Attempt to visualize how the threat will transition from his current positions to those depicted on the template.
Mentally wargame the scheme of maneuver from the positions depicted on the template through to the COA's success or failure. Identify points where forces will transition from one formation to another, potential assembly areas, and so forth.
After working through the scheme of maneuver, identify how each of the BOSs "fits in" and supports the operation. Evaluate time and space factors to develop time phase lines TPLs depicting threat movement.
Draw TPLs on the template to depict the expected progress of attacking forces, the movement of reserves or counterattacking forces, and the movement of forces in the deep and rear battle areas. Base TPLs on the threat's doctrinal rates of movement, with some modification. Evaluate actual movement rates, as revealed in the data base, with written doctrine. Consider the effects of the battlefield environment on mobility.
If contact with friendly forces is expected, mentally wargame the effects this will have on the threat's speed as well. When placing TPLs, consider only the time it will take to adopt movement formations, time to conduct movement to the selected location, and time for the unit to close after arrival. This assumes that time-consuming planning, issuance of orders, reconnaissance, and logistical preparations may occur during movement.
During staff wargaming of the situation templates against potential friendly COAs, update TPLs to consider when threat movement will be triggered or how they might be influenced by friendly actions. Prepare as many graphics as necessary to depict the COA in enough detail to support staff wargaming and collection planning. For example, a COA may begin as a movement to contact, transition to a hasty attack, followed by pursuit operations that include a river crossing.
Each of these phases may require a separate template. Tailor the situation templates to your needs by focusing on the factors that are important to the commander or mission area. For example, the situation might focus only on the threat's reconnaissance assets when determining and developing threat COAs. The situation templates you produce might show only the location and movement routes of these assets, their likely employment areas, and their likely NAIs.
An aviation unit, for example, might develop situation templates that depict details such as specific radar and ADA weapon locations and their range fans or areas of coverage.
At higher echelons the situation templates will usually focus on culminating points and installations or activities associated with centers of gravity rather than specific military units. Some situation templates are better presented in a matrix format.
Figure , for example, illustrates a situation template in matrix form that shows one threat COA for an air strike against friendly targets. The timeline indicates spacing between the various groups as well as the time each group is expected within each NAI. Sometimes, situation templates are replaced by other products, such as a key facilities and targets overlay.
Use whatever technique best graphically illustrates the threat's COAs. This is a description of the activities of the forces depicted on the situation template. It can range from a narrative description to a detailed "synchronization matrix" depicting the activities of each unit and BOS in detail. It should address the earliest time the COA can be executed, timelines and phases associated with the COA, and decisions the threat commander will make during execution of the COA and after.
You use the COA description to support staff wargaming and to develop the event template and supporting indicators. Start with the description of preferred tactics that accompanies the doctrinal template. As you mentally wargame the situation template, note when and where you expect the threat to take certain actions or make certain decisions, such as transition to pre-battle formations, execute branch plans, etc.
Record each event into the description of the COA. Where possible, tie each event or activity to TPLs or other specific geographical areas on the situation template.
This will help you later when constructing the event template. As the threat force approaches DPs or option points, record each decision and its timeline into the COA description. The description you develop forms the basis for the development of threat branches or sequels, should they be necessary to support friendly planning.
Also record any decision criteria that are associated with each DP. Develop the description of the COA into as much detail as time allows and the situation requires. Address each of the BOSS. Use whatever tools or techniques best satisfy your needs. For example, you might use a time event chart or a simple narrative description. Given enough time, you might develop an elaborate matrix.
Regardless of the form initially chosen, the COA statement will be refined to greater detail during the staff wargaming of potential friendly COAs. As you prepare and mentally wargame the situation template, note how and where each of the BOSs provides critical support to the COA.
This leads to identification of HVTs. Use the list of HVTs in the threat model as a guide, but do not be limited by it. As part of his initial planning guidance, the commander uses these gaps as a guide to establish his initial intelligence requirements.
Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities the environment and threat situation offer and is valid in terms of what they will allow. Figure shows this wargaming. Appendix A discusses in more detail the relationship between IPB and wargaming. Following staff recommendations, the commander decides upon a COA and issues implementing orders. He also approves the list of intelligence requirements associated with that COA and identities the most important as priority intelligence requirements PIR.
The command's collection manager uses the results of IPB to develop and implement a collection plan that will satisfy these requirements see IPB and the Collection Management Process. As intelligence confirms or denies planning assumptions on the battlefield environment or the threat's COA, a continuous IPB process identifies new intelligence requirements.
As the battle progresses, IPB is used to continuously evaluate the situation facing the command, driving new iterations of the decision making process and the directing step of the intelligence cycle. For a complete discussion of the decision making process, see FM The targeting process results in targeting guidance that supports the command's COA. This guidance generates additional intelligence requirements in support of each potential friendly COA the targeting process supports.
As part of COA analysis and comparison, or immediately after, the staff generally starts the targeting process with a targeting conference. Using the results of staff wargaming and IPB as a guide, they decide The targeting team further refines the event templates and matrices to include the information required to support targeting.
Figure shows an example attack guidance matrix. During this step the command's collection manager develops collection strategies that will satisfy specific information requirements which support the targeting process.
If BDA is required to support the command's COA, the collection manager plans collection to satisfy that set of requirements as well. Whenever possible, he plans and arranges direct dissemination of targeting intelligence from the collector to the targeting cell or appropriate tire support element FSE.
For a complete discussion of the targeting process, see FM Collection management synchronizes the activities of organizations and systems to provide intelligence the commander needs to accomplish his COA and targeting efforts. IPB helps the commander identify his intelligence requirements and provides the focus and direction needed to satisfy them.
The commander bases his initial intelligence requirements on the critical gaps identified during IPB in the mission analysis step of the decision making process. Refined and updated requirements result from staff wargaming and selection of a particular friendly COA. The remainder of the staff "fights" each potential friendly COA and notes where and when in its execution decisions are required to make the COA successful. They also determine the specific intelligence required to support each decision and record it onto the list of proposed intelligence requirements.
When the commander selects a particular friendly COA, he also approves and prioritizes the supporting intelligence requirements. IPB supports further development of requirements by identifying the activity which will satisfy each requirement and where and when the activity is expected to occur. The event template identities the NAI where the activity will occur.
The event matrix describes the indicators associated with the activity. Both the event template and event matrix depict the times during which the activity is expected to occur. The details these tools provide are the basis of an effective intelligence collection plan. IPB products also contribute to the development of staff synchronization tools such as the DST and battlefield operating system BOS synchronization matrix, shown in Figure The collection manager uses these additional tools to ensure that the collection plan stays synchronized with the command's operations.
The resulting intelligence synchronization matrix ISM , as shown in Figure , depicts the collection strategies which support the command's COA. Intelligence synchronization is more than simply ensuring that collection systems of various sorts are operating 24 hours a day.
The coordination of this entire cycle is intelligence synchronization. FM discusses intelligence synchronization and the collection management process in detail. This supports the commander's decisions during COA execution and helps him to quickly confirm or deny the assumptions used during COA development. Sometimes the battle will progress in a direction unanticipated during the initial IPB and wargaming. The enemy is following his own plans and timelines; those determined during staff wargaming are only estimates.
Therefore, staffs should ensure they use IPB, wargaming, and intelligence synchronization as dynamic tools rather than as one-time events. As the operation unfolds and the enemy's intentions become more clear, reinitiate the IPB and decision making processes as needed. This requires key members of the staff to "huddle" or conduct "mini-wargaming. The battle staff then wargames the best friendly response or preemptive action based on the updated set of IPB predictions.
New decisions and COAs lead to updating and refining the collection plan, intelligence synchronization, and new decision support tools. IPB is an essential element of the intelligence cycle. The products developed during IPB are so critical to this cycle and the staff planning effort that it is a distinct function.
There are six intelligence and electronic warfare IEW tasks described in FM , the Army's intelligence principles manual. They are to develop The ISOS is the flexible architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment that collect, process, store, and disseminate intelligence. IPB products also enable staffs to exploit the modem technology of the ISOS by focusing collection systems that now provide near-real-time NRT information in sufficient accuracy to conduct direct targeting.
IPB not only enables a staff to put steel on target but also helps prioritize and maximize the effects of targeting. IPB plays a critical role in the decision making process. Finally, the commander leads the IPB effort.
The entire staff executes the IPB process. However, the MI unit commander will use the IPB process to support his own unique planning requirements. Some of these involve employment of the ISOS assets under his control. Subscribe Now! Sign In Sign Out. Site maintained by: John Pike. Step 1. Define the Battlefield Environment. Step 2. Describe the Battlefield's Effects.
Doctrine Versus Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
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